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Abstract: On 15 October 2016, the 4th Forum on Regional Cooperation in 
the South China Sea – the Symposium on Cross-Strait Cooperation in the South 
China Sea, was successfully co-hosted by South China Sea Institute of Xiamen 
University, Hainan International Culture Exchange Center, and Hainan Provincial 
Research Center for Policy and Law of the South China Sea in Lingshui, Hainan. 
More than 30 people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait attended the symposium, 
including well-known scholars from Taiwan University, “Academia Sinica”, Sun 
Yat-Sen University (Kaohsiung Taiwan), Taiwan Ocean University and Chengchi 
University, practitioners in Taiwan’s fishery industry, and experts and scholars from 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Hainan University, Shandong University, 
Northwest University of Political Science and Law, Xiamen University and China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. With the purport of cross-Strait 
cooperation in the South China Sea (SCS) in mind, the participants conducted in-
depth discussions on the following aspects: historical records and data in respect 
of the SCS islands, legal status of the SCS waters and islands, fishery management 
in the SCS, marine environmental protection, the relationship between China, the 
U.S. and Japan in the SCS game and the role Taiwan plays in this game. Given the 
significance of this symposium, the author attempts to write a review for it.
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In order to promote the peaceful development of the South China Sea (SCS) 
region and advance further cooperation across the Taiwan Strait on SCS issues, 
the South China Sea Institute of Xiamen University, Hainan International Culture 
Exchange Center, and Hainan Provincial Research Center for Policy and Law of 
the South China Sea co-hosted the 4th Forum on Regional Cooperation in the South 
China Sea – the Symposium on Cross-Strait Cooperation in the South China Sea in 
Lingshui, Hainan. With the great efforts of the participants, a consensus, also called 
“Lingshui Consensus”, was reached concerning cross-Strait cooperation on SCS 
issues. The Lingshui Consensus reads:
1. China’s claims to the sovereignty over the SCS islands are supported by 
sound historical facts and legal evidence. The historically inherited U-shaped line is 
the common heritage of the Chinese nation, whose legal effect shall not be denied. 
Both sides across the Taiwan Strait shall enhance exchange of historical records on 
the SCS, and boost cooperative studies on historical and legal issues in this regard. 
2. The SCS islands of China are entitled to exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
and continental shelf. China has historic rights in the SCS. The Award of the SCS 
Arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, has gross errors or mistakes 
in facts and application of laws. Scholars from both sides should cooperate on the 
study of the related issues in the Award, so as to identify the errors existing in this 
Award, and further to prove the legality of the rights and interests claimed by China 
in the SCS. 
3. Chinese Mainland and Taiwan shall pursue cooperation on the development, 
conservation and management of SCS fishery resources and environment, and 
enhance exchange of and cooperation on relevant information, technology and 
policies. 
4. Both sides shall urge the Democratic Progressive Party to denounce its 
“Taiwan independence policy”, acknowledge the “1992 Consensus”, develop cross-
Strait relations, and safeguard China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests 
in the SCS.
Prof. Kuen-chen FU, director of South China Sea Institute, Xiamen Univer-
sity, gave the opening address of the symposium. He said, “the two sides of the 
Strait belonging to one China” is an essential principle of constitution. Being a 
fundamental law, constitution cannot be overruled by any law, policy or arrange-
ment. “The two sides of the Strait belonging to one China” is not just a legal issue, 
but also follows human emotion and nature. Therefore, this basic standpoint cannot 
be arbitrarily changed by anyone. The SCS situation was volatile in recent years. 
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In fact, as early as 2002, China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC) with ASEAN countries, which provides for the means 
to settle all disputes concerning the SCS. All Parties to the DOC agree to settle 
SCS disputes through peaceful means upon friendly consultations and negotiations. 
Pending the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Parties undertake: a) to exercise 
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes; 
b) to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, 
to build trust and confidence between and among them; c) and to conduct 
cooperative activities, including marine environmental protection, search and 
rescue operation and combating transnational crime.
Regrettably, ASEAN countries failed to attach much importance to the DOC 
for more than a decade. In many international conferences, some ASEAN and 
Western scholars even hold that the DOC goes beyond international law, therefore 
it has no binding force. Actually, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
clearly provides for the three substantial requirements of treaties, which definitely 
do not include the title of a treaty. First, the party concluding an agreement should 
have the competence to conclude treaties. The DOC was concluded and signed by 
each State’s foreign ministers or their representatives, who have full competence 
to sign the declaration. Second, specific rights and obligations shall be contained 
in a treaty. In light of the basic framework of SCS dispute settlement as mentioned 
above, the DOC articulates the rights and obligations of each contracting party. 
Lastly but most importantly, each contracting party should subjectively deem the 
treaty to be legally binding. It is observed that as the biggest country in China-
ASEAN community, China, having the largest population and the longest coastline 
along the northern SCS, has always regarded the DOC as a binding treaty. 
However, under the request of a couple of other countries, China and ASEAN now 
determines to develop the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
In January 2013, the Philippines, breaching the DOC it signed, initiated the 
SCS Arbitration against China. First, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted for this 
case lacks jurisdiction in itself, because the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) strictly restricts compulsory jurisdiction based on the 
principle of sovereign equality. Second, numerous fallacies or errors can be found 
in the Award. Among them, one obvious error is that China’s historic rights within 
the SCS U-shaped line, which are supported by abundant historical evidence 
accumulated for thousands of years, were totally repudiated by the Tribunal. For 
this error, the Tribunal only explained, “we cannot find any supporting evidence, 
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therefore China has no rights”. Why cannot the Tribunal find any evidence? That is 
because China did not participate in the arbitral procedure, and the Tribunal failed 
to collect relevant materials written in Chinese, let alone reading and understanding 
them. In that case, it is imperative for China to let the Tribunal and the world 
know its ample historical evidence concerning the SCS. Another apparent fallacy 
concerns the definition of the SCS islands. The Award rules that the Nansha Islands 
as a whole, including Taiping Island, Thitu Island, West York Island, Nanshan 
Island, Southwest Cay and Northeast Cay, are not islands, but rocks which cannot 
generate 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf. However, the truth is quite 
the contrary, since the criterion to define an island under Article 121 of UNCLOS 
is the “capability” of an island to sustain human habitation or economic life of its 
own, rather than de facto existence of habitation by a settled group or community in 
history. Maritime features claimed by many States, if judged by the latter standard, 
can not qualify as islands under law, and the EEZ and continental shelf delineated 
based on these islands should also be illegal. Consequently, the SCS Arbitration, 
from the outset, is a ridiculous political farce staged under euro-centrism.
I. Collection of Historical Data on the SCS Islands 
     by the Two Sides of the Strait
A. The Correlation Between Studies on the History of the SCS Islands
    and Sovereignty Protection
Shi-yeoung TANG, a research fellow at the Research Center for Humanities 
and Social Sciences of “Academia Sinica”, delivered a report entitled “The 
Correlation Between Studies on the History of the SCS Islands and Sovereignty 
Protection: Focusing on the History of Taiping Island in Nansha Islands”. Historical 
facts constitute an important base supporting the defence of state sovereignty. 
In 1909, Guangdong provincial government protected its sovereignty over the 
Dongsha Island by presenting solid historical evidence. This is a perfect example in 
this case. Following this logic, the report explores the correlation between studies 
on the history of the SCS islands and sovereignty protection, focusing on the 
establishment of the Taiping Island.
After producing a series of records and pictures written in English, French, 
Japanese or other foreign languages, the report points out, prior to the 20th century, 
Taiping Island and its adjacent features had already been included as the living 
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areas of SCS fishermen, where the fishermen processed their catches, took a rest 
and buried their dead relatives or friends. The fishing gear, housing and tombs 
of the fishermen found on the Taiping Island, can also be utilized as historical 
evidence proving this point. At the end, TANG concluded his presentation by 
saying, since he has collated and interpreted more than ten thousand of documents 
about SCS in recent years, he plans to draft a monograph on the history of Taiping 
Island, attempting to make the records about the activities that the Chinese 
people conducted on this island resurface, to exhibit the efforts and the specific 
achievements that humans made on the island to improve their living environment, 
and further to demonstrate that Taiping Island is really an island based on the 
economic activities carried out on the island. 
B. Works on the SCS Issued by the Taiwan Authorities in the 1970s 
LIM Chuan-tiong, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Modern 
History, “Academia Sinica”, delivered a report titled “Works on SCS Issued by 
the Taiwan Authorities in the 1970s: the Release of the Memorandum on Xisha 
and Nansha Islands and Its Significance Seen from the Archives of the ‘Foreign 
Ministry’”. By referring to the Archives of the “Foreign Ministry” stored in the 
archives of the Institute of Modern History, “Academia Sinica”, this report attempts 
to outline the background against which the Taiwan Authorities prepared the 
Memorandum on Xisha and Nansha Islands in the early 1970s, and examine the 
release process, historical significance and impacts of the memorandum. 
The preparation of the Memorandum on Xisha and Nansha Islands consumed 
three years of time, which began in 1971 and ended in 1974. The proximate cause 
for the release of the memorandum is the challenges posed by the Philippines 
and Vietnam in the SCS, and the remote cause is the crisis due to the Philippines’ 
scramble for oil resources as well as the resulting East China Sea crisis. In order 
to cope with the SCS situation with an overall plan in mind, the “Executive Yuan” 
of Taiwan set up a cross-sectoral Special Task Force for the SCS Islands, which 
convened two meetings between May and July of 1971. After three years’ efforts, 
the Memorandum on Xisha and Nansha Islands prepared by the Department of East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Taiwan, came out on 
12 February 1974. Containing ten pages in total, the memorandum is divided into 
three parts: the first part (historical basis) includes 16 items; the second part (legal 
basis) is subdivided into two sections, one is treaties and the other is jurisprudence; 
A Review of the 4th Forum on Regional Cooperation in the South China Sea 285
the third part (proof from international publications and materials) contains 8 items. 
Apart from that, the memorandum is affixed with an additional appendix of 7 pages 
– “Relevant Terms and English Translated Materials”, which contains, among 
others, islands names, treaties and maps. 
After the UNCLOS was adopted at the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea in 1982, the situation in the SCS becomes increasingly complex, and the 
mad scramble for marine resources becomes intensified. During this period, Taiwan 
authorities, on the one hand, continue its effective exercise of jurisdiction over 
Taiping Island and Dongsha Island, and on the other hand, continue to claim the 
sovereignty over the four groups of islands in the SCS. During this process, the 
Memorandum on Xisha and Nansha Islands, released by the Taiwan authorities 
in 1974, has played a vital role in the publicity work concerning SCS. And this 
memorandum also becomes the source of the Memorandum on SCS Policies 
released by the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Taiwan on 21 March 2016.
C. Current Studies on the History of SCS
LI Guoqiang, a research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, made a report entitled “Some Thoughts on 
the Current Studies about the History of SCS”. His report argues that the studies on 
the SCS history made by the scholars of Chinese Mainland can be roughly divided 
into three stages: the first stage, spanning from 1949 when the People’s Republic 
of China was established to the 1960s, is a period when the SCS history is open to 
research; the second stage, which spans from the 1970s to the early 1980s, is most 
productive; the third stage, lasting from 1980s to now, is a period when the SCS 
history studies flourish. In the third stage, Mainland scholars, at the macroscopic 
level, further explore the historical basis supporting and the complete historical 
facts about China’s sovereignty over the SCS islands, and at the microscopic level, 
investigate place names and other aspects. At the meantime, Mainland scholars 
have embraced an interdisciplinary approach, where history, international law and 
many other disciplines are integrated together. They have also paid more attention 
on the digging-out and collection of historical records on SCS, which gradually 
enriches the evidence substantiating China’s sovereignty over the SCS islands.
After describing the progress of the studies on SCS history, the report 
summarizes the logic system of Mainland research on SCS history into four aspects 
as follows: first, elements deciding territory ownership are generalized into four 
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parts by the historians, namely first discovery, first naming, first development 
and management, and first and continuous exercise of administrative jurisdiction. 
These four elements run through the whole process of sovereignty formation and 
development. They appeared one by one in the Qin and Han Dynasties, became 
increasingly complete after the Tang and Song Dynasties, and were ultimately 
fixed in the period between the late Qing Dynasty and the modern age. Second, 
in the eyes of Mainland historians, China’s sovereignty over the SCS islands 
has been formed and developed through a long term. That is to say, after two 
thousand years of historical evolution, the peaceful development and exploration 
carried out by the Chinese people, and the continuous military and administrative 
jurisdiction exercised by every Chinese administration in history, should qualify 
China as the sole owner of the sovereignty over the SCS islands. Third, Mainland 
historians argue that the jurisdiction exercised by every Chinese administration in 
history is manifested in many aspects, including official naming, opening of sea 
routes, fishing activities, and patrol of naval force. These jurisdictional activities 
highlight the exclusive control and utilization of the SCS islands by every Chinese 
administration, as well as the great attention paid by each Chinese administration to 
the continuous development and management of SCS resources. Fourth, Mainland 
historians have also objectively examined and reviewed the activities carried out 
by other States neighboring the SCS. They have not ruled out the possibility that 
ancestors of these neighboring States also engaged in production activities in the 
SCS region. However, compared with China, other neighboring States lack the 
complete historical process of developing, managing and governing the SCS, not to 
say satisfying the basic requirements to establish sovereignty over the SCS islands 
and the effectiveness and legality of such sovereignty. 
The report also points out some problems existing in the studies on the 
SCS history of both sides across the Strait, and proposes three suggestions in 
this regard. Firstly, both sides of the Strait should work together to construct the 
discourse system in respect of the historical basis supporting China’s sovereignty 
over the SCS islands. The power of discourse determines the power of initiative. 
A scientific, complete, persuasive, and emotionally appealing system of discourse, 
may help us lead the research direction with regard to the SCS, and may also be 
coupled with legal basis to effectively defend and consolidate China’s rights to the 
SCS. Secondly, both sides should pool their efforts together to further their studies 
on SCS history, and learn from each other. Thirdly, both sides should cooperate to 
complete the chain of evidence concerning the SCS, by systematically collating the 
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existing literature, and consistently gathering new historical literature home and 
abroad. 
At the end of his report, Mr. LI concluded, the challenge to China’s sovereign-
ty over the SCS islands is, to some extent, a battle for China to fight for the 
dignity of its SCS history. In this battle, historians of both sides of the Strait have 
responsibilities to fulfill. 
II. Position of the Two Sides Across the Strait on the SCS
     and the Actions Need to Be Taken 
A. Positions on the Legal Status of SCS Waters and SCS Islands 
    by the Two Sides of the Strait
In his report “Positions on the Legal Status of SCS Waters and SCS Islands 
by the Two Sides of the Strait”, Prof. ZOU Ligang from Hainan University, after 
comparing the oceans legislation of Chinese Mainland with that of Taiwan, asserts 
that both sides embrace identical positions on oceans law. Chinese Mainland and 
Taiwan, in accordance with the regimes of territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ 
and continental shelf under the UNCLOS, created their own regimes corresponding 
to the relevant sea areas. Though both sides claim sovereignty over the four groups 
of islands in the SCS, the laws of both sides are silent on the question whether the 
regimes of contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf can apply to each island or 
feature in the SCS islands.
When analyzing the legal status of the U-shaped line, Prof. ZOU holds that 
the line was delineated on two main bases: one is the mature regimes of territory 
and territorial sea, and the other is the newly established regimes of continental 
shelf and EEZ. Chinese Mainland and Taiwan both adopt the principle of “the 
land dominates the sea”. In other words, after confirming that the four groups 
of islands belong to China, they claim relevant territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
EEZ and continental shelf according to the island regime under the UNCLOS. 
Hence, considering the U-shaped line as a islands ownership line, may felicitously 
illustrate the original intention of the delineation of the line, and also complies 
with the current rules of oceans law, international treaties related to the status of 
SCS islands, and the legislation of Chinese Mainland and Taiwan. Notably, this 
postulation of islands ownership line might have defects in itself, since under 
Article 121 of the UNCLOS, the rights that China may claim on the basis of rocks 
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are limited. However, China could, according to the modern oceans law, claim 
sovereignty over the internal waters located within the baselines of the four groups 
of SCS islands, and relevant rights to their adjacent waters, i.e., sovereignty over 
territorial sea, jurisdiction over contiguous zone, as well as sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over EEZ and continental shelf. At the meantime, such rights would 
not be prejudicial to the historic rights that China enjoys over other areas enclosed 
by the U-shaped line. Such historic rights are analogous to the rights that a coastal 
State enjoys in its EEZ under the UNCLOS. 
At the symposium, WANG Zelin, an associate professor at the School of 
International Law, Northwest University of Political Science and Law, delivered 
a presentation titled “Cross-Strait Understanding on the Legal Nature of the SCS 
Waters and Their Common Ground”. After analyzing the Position of the “Ministry 
of the Interior (Taiwan)” on the Results of South China Sea Arbitration, and a series 
of declarations issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chinese Mainland, 
Professor WANG argues that both sides of the Strait have a consistent position 
with respect to the legal status of SCS waters, both holding that China has historic 
rights in the SCS. In the eyes of Taiwan, it has historic rights over the SCS islands 
and their “adjacent waters”, without explaining the nature of “adjacent waters”. 
The presenter believes that historic rights can be divided into two kinds: one is the 
exclusive right of a sovereignty nature, such as the sovereignty over the territory 
acquired through occupation, and the other is non-exclusive rights without a 
sovereignty nature, such as the right to use sea areas. The rights China enjoys over 
the SCS islands and their adjacent waters are of a sovereignty nature, which also 
fall under the scope of historic rights. Such rights of China are obtained through 
means comparable with the acquisition of territory through occupation. With regard 
to the specific contents of the rights without a sovereignty nature, views vary in the 
academia; nevertheless, fishing rights and navigation rights are definitely included. 
Lastly, the existence of historic rights is an undeniable truth, and historic rights 
are not equivalent to rights to the high seas. In this context, Chinese Mainland 
and Taiwan shall safeguard their rights and interests in the SCS and preserve their 
ancestral property together.
B. The Actions That Both Sides of the Strait Should Take Toward 
    the SCS Islands and Their Adjacent Waters
Shih-Ming KAO, an assistant professor at the Institute of Marine Affairs, 
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Sun Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung Taiwan), delivered a presentation named 
“The Actions That Both Sides of the Strait Should Take Toward the SCS Islands 
and Their Adjacent Waters: A Perspective from Japan’s Practice Concerning the 
Okinotori-shima”. Kao made a case study of Japan’s Okinotori-shima. Although 
the Northern Islet of the Okinotori-shima is above water at high tide, its total 
area is less than 10 square meters. Northern Islet therefore can only qualify as a 
“rock” under the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, Japan consolidated the rock through 
artificial means. Specifically, it planted corals on the rock and then sold them back 
in its mainland. Based on such “economic activities” on the rock, Japan claimed 
200 nautical miles EEZ, and arrested the fishing boats which enter into the zone 
it claimed. One the other hand, Japan even claimed areas of continental shelf 
extending beyond 200 nautical miles based on the rock, and submitted its claims 
to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for review. 
Finally, two of the three areas of continental shelf claimed by Japan on the basis of 
the Okinotori-shima were approved. In other words, Japan intends to, through the 
procedure of the CLCS, further establish the international basis supporting its claim 
that “Okinotori-shima is an island rather than a rock”.
Conversely, in the award of Sino-Philippine SCS Arbitration, all the maritime 
features of the Nansha Islands that are above water at high tide, including Taiping 
Island, are considered as “rocks” which have no EEZ or continental shelf by the 
arbitrators. This ruling is inconsistent with the definition of “island” under the 
UNCLOS. In fact, the UNCLOS only states that the islands themselves must be 
naturally formed, but does not expressly provide that the condition of “sustaining 
human habitation or economic life of their own” must also be “naturally formed”. 
Due to science and technology advances, a rock, which was previously considered 
unsustainable for human habitation or economic life of its own, may now have the 
chance to satisfy the requirements and standards of an island under the UNCLOS, 
not to mention the Taiping Island that has fresh water on itself.
Therefore, although the Arbitral Tribunal made a ruling unfavorable to Chinese 
Mainland and Taiwan, both sides of the Strait should continue to take actions to 
ensure that the SCS islands enclosed by the U-shaped line are “islands” under the 
UNCLOS. In practice, both sides may refer to Japan’s practice with respect to 
the Okinotori-shima. Specifically, they should continue to reinforce the fact that 
the SCS islands within the U-shaped line are able to sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own, and then file submissions to the CLCS, with an aim to 
consolidate the status of these SCS islands as “islands” under the UNCLOS.
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C. The Influence of SCS Arbitration on the Practice Relating to 
     the Regime of Island
Associate Professor Tzong-Han TAI from Law School of Shandong University 
delivered a report – “Practice with Respect to the Regime of Island after the SCS 
Arbitration: Clarifying the Criteria or Creating Disputes”. The report alleges that 
the Philippines degraded Taiping Island to a rock, aiming to eliminate a sizable 
area of possible overlapping EEZ between the Philippines and China, and further 
to illegalize China’s actions in the SCS. The Arbitral Tribunal of the case, when 
deliberating the legal status of Taiping Island, arbitrarily interpreted the vague 
wording of “sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” under 
the UNCLOS. In the view of the Tribunal, the condition of “sustaining human 
habitation or economic life of their own” include five aspects: the presence of 
potable fresh water, vegetation and biology, soil and agricultural potential, presence 
of fishermen and commercial operations. That is to say, five arbitrators of the case 
offered an explicit legal interpretation to Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, which the 
negotiators of each State were afraid and reluctant to do during the preparation 
of the convention. However, a closer look into the legal interpretation given by 
the Arbitral Tribunal may reveal that: the five review standards decided by the 
arbitrators on their own are drawn mainly on the basis of the arbitrators’ free 
evaluation of evidence, which would meet great difficulties in practice. Such an 
expansive interpretation may give rise to the problem of “judge-made law”, and 
also create more legal disputes due to the possible absence of international practice 
in this regard.
Adopting a negative approach, Chinese Mainland and Taiwan may cooperate 
to consistently express their position of neither accepting nor recognizing the so-
called “arbitral award”. Adopting a positive approach, both sides could cooperate 
to consistently claim that the ruling on the status of SCS islands flies in the face of 
facts and international practice. The claim that “the ruling on the status of islands is 
wrong” may become a tacit consensus between the two sides.
III. Cross-Strait Cooperation on SCS Fisheries
       Management and Marine Environmental Protection
A. Legal Bases for Cross-Strait Cooperation on SCS Fisheries
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Prof. CHANG Yen-chiang from Law School of Shandong University gave a 
speech titled “Legal Bases for Cross-Strait Cooperation on SCS Fisheries”. Prof. 
CHANG first analyzed the status quo of the exploitation of fishery resources in the 
SCS, and then described the legal and other basis for cross-Strait cooperation on 
fisheries in the SCS. Lastly, he primarily examined the impacts that the Regulations 
concerning Distant Water Fisheries Management of Taiwan might impose upon 
cross-Strait cooperation on SCS fisheries.
With regards to the division of SCS fishing areas between two sides of the 
Strait, Chinese Mainland has the jurisdiction over Northern SCS and Xisha, 
Zhongsha and Nansha Islands, while Taiwanese fishermen could fish around 
Dongsha Islands, Zhongzhou Reef and Taiping Island. In the view of Prof. Chang, 
currently, too many fishing vessels are operating in the SCS, with small fishing 
boats dominating the scene. In addition to that, the structure of fishing operation 
in the SCS is unreasonable. In this context, it is suggested to further reduce the 
total number of fishing vessels in the SCS, by mainly cutting the number of small 
boats and maintaining large ships in an appropriate scale; and to further adjust the 
structure of fishing operation, by discouraging trawling and gill-netting operation 
of small fishing boats, actively developing angling, and properly developing 
deepwater trawling and seine fishing.
The legal bases for cross-Strait cooperation on SCS fisheries primarily include 
the following six aspects: a) a cross-Strait consensus on the historic rights to the 
SCS area enclosed by the U-shaped line; b) Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang 
Talks; c) the shared vision of cross-Strait peaceful development; d) three letters 
of intent, including the 2009 Letter of Intent Concerning Joint Formulation of a 
Plan for the Conservation and Preservation of the Fishery Resources in the Taiwan 
Strait, the 2009 Letter of Intent Concerning Cross-Strait Academic Exchanges 
and Cooperation on Marine and Fisheries Issues, the 2009 Memorandum on 
Pushing the Settlement of Fishery Disputes between the Two Sides of the Strait; 
e) the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement; and f) the 
Consensus on Strengthening Cross-Strait Industrial Cooperation reached between 
the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF). Other bases for cross-Strait cooperation include: a) 
the overall interests of the Chinese nation, which requires both sides of the Strait 
to shelve their political differences and unite against foreign intervention in the 
name of “the Chinese nation”; b) a cross-Strait consensus on marine policy, i.e., 
shelving disputes and joint development; c) the cooperation between ARATS and 
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SEF, and the nongovernmental academic forums on SCS issues jointly held by 
Taiwan Chengchi University and the National Institute of South China Sea Studies, 
which provide the nongovernmental basis for cross-Strait cooperation on fisheries; 
d) Taiwan’s need for distant-water fishery resources to compensate for its depletion 
of inshore fishery resources, and Mainland’s need for advanced distant-water 
fishery technology, as well as the need for the unity of the two sides to fight against 
other States’ looting for resources. Therefore, cross-Strait cooperation on fishery 
resources is just around the corner.
WANG Jiwei, an associate professor at the Law School of Hainan University, 
made a presentation entitled “The Secret Behind Why Geng Lu Bu (Manual of 
Sea Routes) Can Be Preserved for Hundreds of Years”. Serving as an important 
document for SCS studies, Geng Lu Bu (Manual of Sea Routes) also demonstrates 
the long-standing and well-established cooperation on fisheries between the two 
sides of the Strait. In addition, as nongovernmental evidence, the manual is original, 
objective and authentic. The manual and official evidence can mutually verify each 
other, which can contribute to the creation of an evidence chain to prove that the 
SCS is the ancestral sea of Hainan fishermen. The SCS is not only the place where 
these fishermen reside and engage in livelihood and production activities, but also 
their spiritual homeland. 
B. A Feasible Plan for Cross-Strait Cooperation on SCS Fisheries 
HE Shengchu, the former president and current adviser of the Overseas 
Fisheries Development Council of Taiwan, proposed in his report a feasible plan 
for cross-Strait cooperation on fisheries management in the SCS. Both sides of the 
Strait may take the following initiatives: a) to exchange information concerning 
the number of operating vessels, fishing methods, fish-catch amount, ocean 
caught fish species, categories of the by-catches, etc.; b) to cooperate on studies 
of conserved species, such as marine mammals, sea turtles, seabirds and shark 
rays; c) to pool efforts in the conservation and preservation of SCS marine ecology 
and biodiversity; d) to collaborate to combat IUU fishing and exchange relevant 
information; e) to cooperate on the assessment of major fish species and any 
associated studies; and f) to notify each other any crime at sea and illegal fishing 
activities upon detection. 
XUE Xiongzhi, the Executive Dean of Coastal and Ocean Management 
Institute, Xiamen University, delivered a report titled “Cross-Strait Cooperation on 
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Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the SCS”. After analyzing 
the necessity and feasibility of cooperation on SCS fisheries between the two sides 
of the Strait, the report suggests to establish a cooperation framework mechanism 
on resource conservation. To this end, a basic cooperation model has been conceiv-
ed, which could be first implemented around the Taiwan shoal.
The two sides of the Strait need to cooperate on SCS fisheries on account of 
the following factors. First, Chinese Mainland and Taiwan have joint fishing areas 
in the Yellow Sea and East and South China Seas. And the development status of 
fishery resources is closely bound up with both sides. Second, joint conservation 
of SCS fishery resources could serve as the starting point for both sides to reduce 
tensions and implement the COC at the regional level, and also as a breakthrough 
in this regard. Thirdly, regional fishery conservation requires corresponding 
surveillance and management capacity; cross-Strait cooperation could help the two 
sides complement each other’s advantages and enhance their conservation and co-
management capabilities, ultimately leading to the improvement of people’s well-
being.
Considering the current and future foreseeable complicated factors, cross-
Strait cooperation on SCS fisheries shall be gradually promoted step by step and 
stage by stage.
First, in the initial stage, cross-Strait cooperation could be carried out in 
traditional joint fishing areas by applying uniform environmental standards and 
consistent management rules. In the fishery cooperation pilot site located within 
their joint fishing areas, Chinese Mainland and Taiwan may cooperate to: a) 
conserve and preserve offshore fishery. Particularly, in their shared coastal waters 
or the coastal waters of the two sides adjacent to each other, along with the Taiwan 
Strait, both sides shall join hands to protect offshore marine habitats, and monitor 
and forecast marine pollution and red tide disasters, in order to mitigate the serious 
impacts of marine pollution on inshore fisheries, and further to effectively conserve 
inshore fisheries and achieve ecological restoration; b) implement the fishing 
moratorium system. Provisions on prohibited fishing seasons, areas and species are 
different in the fishery laws and regulations of both sides, which is unfavorable to 
the orderly development and effective protection of SCS fisheries for both sides. 
Consequently, both sides shall adopt a unified fishing moratorium system. In doing 
so, fishermen from both Chinese Mainland and Taiwan could follow the same rules, 
which would eventually reduce fishery disputes and promote rational exploitation 
of fishery resources of both sides; c) enforce the relevant laws. The two sides may 
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jointly conduct law enforcement activities on a regular basis in their joint fishing 
areas, collaborate to investigate illegal fishing activities, and establish a reporting 
system for fishery law enforcement. The two sides shall inform each other of its 
law-enforcement vessels performing tasks in their joint sea areas, and strengthen 
interactive cooperation at sea, if necessary, so that emergent fishery incidents 
and disputes could be handled in a timely manner, and their fishery management 
efficiency could be raised. Moreover, they shall establish a joint rescue mechanism 
with respect to fishery accidents in the SCS, so as to safeguard SCS fishery security 
together.
Second, in the long run, the area of the SCS where Chinese Mainland and 
Taiwan may conduct fisheries cooperation is not limited to the agreed zone within 
the fishery cooperation pilot site; instead, utilizing their respective advantages, they 
may carry out deeper cooperation in a larger marine area as follows:
a) cooperation on pelagic fishery. The advantages of both sides are highly 
complementary. Therefore, they can work together to drive the co-management 
of IUU fishing, crack down on illegal fishing vessels, and protect the legitimate 
fishing interests of both sides;
b) cooperation on developing eco-fisheries around SCS islands or features. 
Taiwan’s recreational fishery has developed rapidly. Both Chinese Mainland 
and Taiwan have a long history of fisheries culture in the SCS, and the fisheries 
culture of both sides is closely linked and can be traced back to the same origin. 
In that case, they can establish protected areas on the islands or features under 
their jurisdiction or in their marine areas, aiming to preserve and conserve fishery 
resources. Using these protected areas as ecological fishery bases, the two sides can 
integrate their fisheries culture and tourism resources together. Particularly, they 
can jointly develop high-quality tourism products concerning SCS fishery, through 
designing routes for fishery sightseeing and leisure upon consultations. By doing 
so, ecological health and sustainable development of fish stocks in the SCS could 
be also maintained; 
c) cooperation on fishery protection. Predatory and illegal fishing in the 
SCS by the bordering States is one of the main reasons leading to the depletion 
of SCS fishery resources. Fishermen from Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, when 
conducting normal fishing activities, are often forcibly expelled or even arrested 
by other States surrounding the SCS. In this context, both sides need to carry out 
fishery protection activities together in their traditional joint fishing area. To be 
specific, Mainland’s fishery law enforcement agencies and Taiwan’s “Coast Guard 
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Administration”, which is responsible for law enforcement at sea in Taiwan, may 
cooperate and coordinate further to conduct such joint law enforcement activities 
against illegal foreign fishing in the SCS. On the one hand, such activities would 
show the determination of both sides to safeguard China’s rights and interests in the 
SCS, and on the other hand, would protect the safety and legal rights and interests 
of Chinese fishermen, as well as stabilize the order of fishery in the SCS.
C. Conservation of the Marine Resources of the Dongsha Atoll 
     and Fisheries Protection
CHOU Chen-yu, an associate professor at the Institute of the Law of the Sea, 
Taiwan Ocean University, delivered a report tilted “Conservation of the Marine 
Resources of the Dongsha Atoll and Fisheries Protection”. After giving the basic 
information about the management station of the Dongsha Atoll National Park and 
the establishment process of the station, the report looks into the significance of 
cross-Strait cooperation on fisheries through analyzing some fisheries protection 
events. 
The Dongsha Atoll is a typical circular atoll located in the northern part of 
SCS. It is 240 nautical miles (444 km) away from Kaohsiung City. With unique 
marine ecological environment, the atoll provides rich bio-diversities of marine 
life. It is a critical habitat and an important provenance center linking SCS with 
Taiwan marine ecological environment. In recent years, fishing vessels of Chinese 
Mainland often conducted illegal fishing activities in waters near the Dongsha Atoll, 
which is administered under Qijin District, Kaohsiung City. Such activities attracted 
the attention of Taiwan inspection and maritime patrol authorities. They started 
to strictly suppress such activities, and conducted investigation and inspection on 
the Dongsha Island. However, falling short of competence, the Taiwan authorities 
failed to seize all illegal vessels upon investigation. Limited achievements in this 
regard show the predicament that Taiwan faces in its atoll and fisheries protection 
work. Notably, one of the most serious incidents happened on 23 March 2016. 
Taiwan patrol personnel discovered and then seized the Mainland registered ship 
Qiongqiong Haiyu No. 05055, which had illegally caught coral and shellfish up to 
15 tonnes within the Dongsha Atoll National Park. They also found two live green 
turtles, and 31.3 kilos of green turtle meat on board. In the incident, 41 fishermen 
from Mainland were arrested and brought to justice. This incident reveals that it is 
still challenging and difficult for Taiwan’s maritime patrol authorities to conduct 
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law enforcement activities in this marine area, since it is remote from Taiwan 
Island. In this connection, Taiwan should enhance communication with the fisheries 
authorities of Hainan Province of Chinese Mainland, and create a communication 
platform for the law enforcement authorities across the Strait, aiming at preserving 
the valuable marine ecological environment of Dongsha Atoll, and maintaining the 
sustainable development of the marine ecological resources.  
IV. The Relationship between China, the U.S. and Japan 
      in the SCS Game and the Role Taiwan Plays 
      in This Game
A. The Role of the U.S. in the SCS Game
Chien-Chon CHEN, the president of the Mainland College Student Association 
of Taiwan, delivered a report named “The Strategies the U.S. and Japan Adopted 
in the SCS Game and the Role Taiwan Plays”. The report focuses on the analysis 
of American and Japanese strategies for the SCS, and then offers a deduction 
about the possible role and strategies of Taiwan in this aspect. American strategies 
towards China has undergone many changes. Facing the rise of China’s military 
power, American Defence Secretary Carter stated, in April 2015, that U.S. Asia-
Pacific rebalance strategy would enter into a new phase, which would cover three 
measures: to develop high-end weapons and deploy more troops to the Asia-Pacific 
region; to strengthen relationships with Japan and other U.S. alliances in the region; 
and to broaden American trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region. After 2016, the 
strategy entered into a phase of comprehensively deploying forces. When the award 
of the SCS Arbitration was delivered, the U.S. nominally supported the award. 
However, under the strong opposition from China, the U.S. did not enter into the 
area of SCS with sovereignty disputes by using its military force, and therefore did 
not exacerbate the disputes for the moment. It can be expected that in the future, 
the U.S. would deploy more advanced military forces to the western Pacific region, 
so as to put pressure on Chinese Mainland with respect to the SCS issue. Regarding 
the tense situation in the SCS, the aftermath of the SCS Arbitration would be a new 
beginning of sharp confrontations.  
B. The Role of Japan in the SCS Game
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Chien-Chon CHEN also explored the underlying reason which drove Japan 
to forcefully intervene in the SCS issue. First, by creating long-term tensions 
in the region, Japan attempts to strategically provoke long-standing conflicts 
and confrontations between China, the U.S. and the relevant ASEAN countries, 
further to contain China and consume its strategic resources, and alleviate China’s 
opposition to Japan’s actions on the Diaoyu Islands. Second, Japan tries to establish 
closer relations with the ASEAN countries, and enhance its influence on political 
security in the region, by highlighting the sovereignty disputes in the SCS. Third, 
in doing so, Japan can also develop a public voice for the amendment of its 
constitution and the building of a strong army, so that the newly passed security bill 
can give the Japanese government more power to utilize military forces overseas. 
Japan is developing a sea-based missile defense system, with the purpose of joining 
the U.S. in creating its global missile defense system. Japan is also beefing up its 
forces on its southwestern islands, seeking to raise its offensive capability, and 
further to control the Miyako Strait and cut off the channel where the Chinese navy 
enter the Pacific. By doing so, Japan also intends to improve its ability to conquer 
or land on the island, and cope with the Diaoyu Islands disputes. Obviously, the 
U.S. and Japan want to effectively consolidate their military alliance network 
through frequent military exercises, so that the two States may jointly deploy their 
forces within this network to contain China. In fact, the U.S. attempts to turn the 
Philippines into a platform severing the purpose of stationing U.S. military forces 
in the Asia-Pacific region. And Japan may gradually join in the U.S.-Philippine 
joint military drills, linking East China Sea with South China Sea. When Japan 
intervenes in the SCS disputes, Japan and China would encounter highly explosive 
conflicts. 
YUAN Chong, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Japanese Studies, 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, made a report entitled 
“The Background and Direction of Japan’s Policy Toward SCS Issues”. The report 
states that Japan has, for a long time, showed great interest in any changes to the 
SCS situation. Prior to the escalation of the SCS disputes, Japan observed the SCS 
issues mainly from the perspective of sea route security. However, limited by the 
capability of Japan Self-Defense Forces and Japanese domestic law, Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force can merely carry out antisubmarine and surveillance activities 
as far as the northern SCS, and the SCS has not been included in the action plan 
of Japan Self-Defense Forces. After the escalation of the SCS disputes, in order 
to support U.S. return to the Asia-Pacific strategy and push the implementation 
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of Japan’s newly adopted security bill, Japan showed unusual interest in the SCS 
issue. Japan is reluctant to be marginalized in the SCS issue, albeit not a party 
to the SCS disputes. It frequently sowed discord and created disturbances in the 
region, pursuing to achieve multiple purposes, including: ensuring its influences 
on the SCS issue, smearing China’s image, developing a loose network of alliances 
to curb China, consolidating its security cooperation with the U.S., building the 
momentum for the transition of its security policies, and mitigating the pressure 
from China concerning the East China Sea. In the future, Japan will continue 
its intervention efforts regarding the SCS issue, through offering supports to 
the building of military and maritime law enforcement capabilities of the States 
concerned, creating diplomatic hotspots, and other means. Nevertheless, Japan 
would adopt a cautious and prudent attitude towards the so-called “patrol of the 
SCS”, or try to test the bottom line of China’s policy by playing “edge ball”. 
C. The Role of Taiwan in the SCS Game and Its Policy Direction
Facing the situation described above, Chien-Chon CHEN mentioned in his 
report that, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, especially 
Taiwan’s current leader Tsai Ing-wen, must be clearly aware of the severe situation 
in the Taiwan Strait, and the considerable gap of military power between the 
two sides across the Strait, thus should not lose their mind to deploy Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile in Taiwan. In addition, the DPP 
administration should neither lean towards the U.S. or Japan, nor lose its own 
stance by waiving its claim to the sovereignty over the territorial sea within the 
U-shaped line; otherwise, Taiwan would send negative messages once more to 
Mainland, further deteriorating the cross-Strait relations. In practice, the DPP 
administration may take the following moves to appease the conflicting interests 
of both sides, foster goodwill and mutual trust between their top government 
officials and reestablish the consultation mechanism between ARATS and SEF: 
first, to disclose the pertinent historical documents to each other, including the 
correspondence between China, relevant international organizations and other 
major countries in the Republican period of China, so as to prove that the Chinese 
government has the sovereignty over the SCS islands; second, to maintain the 
claims to the sovereignty of the territorial sea within the U-shaped line in the SCS, 
and to adamantly protect fisheries and the interests and rights of Chinese fishermen; 
third, to encourage cross-Strait research on joint exploitation of the SCS areas, 
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to promote exchange between the associated academic institutions of both sides, 
to create SCS hydrological databases together with the Chinese Mainland, and to 
reach cooperation agreement with the Mainland concerning marine meteorology, 
emergency relief and other matters. 
Professor LIU Fu-kuo from the Institute of International Relations, Chengchi 
University, delivered a report titled “Policy Options for Taiwan in the SCS Game 
Between China and the U.S.”. The report argues, after the DPP administration 
returned to power in May 2016, Taiwan has the following favorable policy options 
in the SCS game between China and the U.S.: 
First, neither to go beyond the bottom line of its conventional SCS policy, 
nor to deviate from the interests of both sides across the Strait, but to encourage 
nongovernmental cooperation on many fronts; 
Second, to actively manage the SCS on the existing basis, and to initiatively 
seek the understanding of other States bordering the SCS based on its strength and 
power; 
Third, to continue the traditional partnership with the U.S., so as to adapt to 
the needs of the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy; however, Taiwan should 
maintain policy autonomy, to some degree, when it comes to the SCS; 
Fourth, to narrow the internal political division of Taiwan, boost interactions 
across the Strait, and clearly define the direction of its SCS strategy.
D. Challenges and Opportunities of China
WONG Chi-shuen, a Ph.D. candidate of the Department of Diplomacy, Cheng-
chi University, delivered a report titled “Regional Challenges and Opportunities 
of China: Taking the South China Sea as an Example”. The speaker said, in 2016, 
when the situation in the SCS region was rough and volatile, the international 
challenges China faced were not any less, although China publicly declared its 
wish to “shelve disputes and jointly develop” the SCS, and gradually changed its 
initiative of “peaceful rise” into “peaceful development”.
The overall international strategy of the U.S. follows the concept of “balance 
of power” developed by the European powers, which pushes the EU to compete 
with Russia in the continent of Europe, and China with Japan in the Far East. The 
U.S., resembling the U.K. in the 19th century, assists one party in a competition 
as an offshore balancer, which would help that party become the winner or have 
an edge on its competitors. Viewed from this concept, the U.S. developed its Asia-
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Pacific rebalance strategy primarily with two aims: one is to end China’s “period of 
strategic opportunity”, to inhibit China’s continued development, and at the same 
time to stoke tension between China and its neighbors in the hope of diffusing 
China’s power; the second is to benefit from the competition or fight between China 
and Japan. 
The U.S. has strategic interests behind the dramatic SCS Arbitration. It intends 
to fuel regional disputes by stoking the conflicts between China and Southeast 
Asian countries. China refuses to acknowledge the result of the arbitration, calling 
the award “a piece of scrap paper”. Additionally, it continues land reclamation and 
defence works in the SCS region. China insists that the said works are mostly for 
civil ends, and the necessary military installations established in the region are 
limited in number and purely for defence, which are compatible with the security 
situation of the islands concerned. There is no issue of “militarization” here. With 
the respect to the Philippines, after Rodrigo Duterte took office as the Philippines’ 
16th president, he changed the pro-America and anti-China policy adopted by his 
predecessor Benigno Aquino III, and strives to foster cordial relations with China. 
Sino-Philippine relations were strained when the ruling on the SCS Arbitration 
was delivered in July 2016, however the relations suddenly became improving 
and promising in the following September. During the G20 Summit and October 
of the same year, Duterte repeatedly criticized the U.S., bringing up the crimes 
that had been committed by U.S. troops during the U.S. colonization of the 
Philippines, and announcing that an upcoming military joint exercise with the 
U.S. would be the last military exercise between the two States. The SCS disputes 
in the 21st century reflect that international environment changes more violently 
than the internal situation of China. As good fortune and misfortune accompany 
each other, many emergencies would change the overall global situation. If China 
holds to its established national strategy and will not easily give up its strategy 
when challenged by other States, China would ultimately win an edge over its 
competitors. 
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